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Abstract
This study describes the architecture and capabilities of an open source
agent-based Java platform that permits the systematic study of interactions
among hydrology, climate, and strategic human decision-making in a wa-
tershed over time. To demonstrate the platform’s use and capabilities, an
application is presented in accordance with ODD protocol requirements that
captures, in simplified form, the structural attributes of the Squaw Creek wa-
tershed in central Iowa. Illustrative findings are reported for the sensitivity
of farmer and city social welfare outcomes to changes in three key treatment
factors: farmer land-allocation decision method, farmer targeted savings, and
levee quality effectiveness for the mitigation of city flood damage.
Keywords: watershed, agent-based software, coupled natural and human
system, strategic human decision-making, ODD protocol
1. Introduction: Study Scope and Organization
Sustainable access to adequate water ranks among the most serious chal-
lenges facing the world in the 21st century. Finding solutions requires coor-
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dinated efforts by natural and social scientists, engineers, water managers,
policy-makers, and stakeholders from the broader community. These groups
have diverse interests, values, histories, and disciplinary perspectives. Chang-
ing climate, demographics, and economic demands add to the challenge by
presenting a moving target. Complicating matters further are the complex
and seemingly contradictory messages the public receives about expected
changes, especially concerning climate (Barsugli et al., 2013; Hewitson et al,
2014). This poor communication allows parties to focus on messages that
align best with their views, ignoring other viewpoints (Sarewitz, 2004).
Cohesive planning for sustained water resources with community sup-
port will thus require continual co-development of knowledge and problem
solutions (Rosenzweig et al., 2014). Software frameworks permitting wa-
ter sustainability issues to be studied from multiple viewpoints by means
of systematic computational experimentation can potentially enhance this
co-development.
This paper describes the development of the W ater And C limate C hange
Watershed (WACCShed) Platform, an agent-based Java framework permit-
ting the systematic study of watersheds as coupled natural and human sys-
tems (Liu et al., 2007). A distinctive feature of the platform is that it permits
a careful modeling of the physical and institutional environment that shapes
and channels the actions of human watershed participants. In turn, as ad-
vocated by An (2012), it permits a watershed environment to be affected
by the actions and interactions of its human participants. WACCShed has
been released as open source software under the GNU General Public License
(GPL) at a code and data repository site (Jie et al., 2016).
A watershed application is presented in order to demonstrate, in con-
crete terms, the capabilities and use of the WACCShed platform. For clarity
of exposition, the presentation adheres to the ODD (Overview, Design con-
cepts, and Details) protocol developed by Grimm et al. (2006, 2010a,b). The
watershed application captures, in highly simplified form, the structural at-
tributes of the Squaw Creek watershed in central Iowa (Wendt, 2007). The
application restricts attention to two types of decision makers, a representa-
tive farmer and a city manager, in order to identify with care the manner
in which their strategic interactions and risk-management practices result in
an intrinsic dynamic coupling of natural and human systems. Illustrative
findings are reported showing the sensitivity of farmer and city social welfare
outcomes to changes in three key treatment factors: farmer land-allocation
decision method, farmer targeted savings level, and levee quality effectiveness
2
for the mitigation of city flood damage.
Section 2 clarifies the relationship of this study to previous related studies.
Section 3 discusses key features of the WACCShed platform architecture.
The watershed application is presented in Sections 4–6 in accordance with
the three ODD protocol categories (overview, design concepts, and details).
A welfare sensitivity study for the watershed application is developed in
Section 7, and illustrative findings from this study are reported in Section 8.
Section 9 provides concluding discussion.
2. Relationship to Existing Literature
In traditional water resource management studies, human activities such
as land use, construction, and policy determination were typically modeled
as externally imposed interventions. In contrast, the emerging field of socio-
hydrology treats environments and human inhabitants as co-evolving factors
(Sivapalan et al., 2012). In this way, socio-hydrological models can account
for two-way feedback between human and environmental systems (Gordon et
al., 2008) and address not only physical processes but also social, political,
cultural, economic, and ethical issues within integrated system frameworks.
One approach enabling the integrated dynamic modeling of human and
environmental systems is agent-based modeling (ABM), the representation
of real-world systems as open-ended dynamic systems of interacting “agents”
(Axelrod and Tesfatsion, 2006; Borrill and Tesfatsion, 2011; Tesfatsion, 2011;
Chen, 2016; Tesfatsion, 2016a). An agent is an entity capable of acting over
time within its modeled world on the basis of its own internal data, attributes,
and methods. Agents can represent a broad spectrum of entities ranging from
passive physical features to sophisticated human decision makers.
As noted by many previous researchers, ABM is well suited for the study
of dynamic coupled natural and human systems (An, 2012; Heckbert et al,
2010; Muller et al., 2014; Filatova et al., 2013; Tesfatsion, 2016b). ABM
permits models to be tailored to real-world systems rather than forcing re-
searchers to simplify system representations purely for analytical tractability.
It enables researchers to develop empirically-based frameworks that capture
the salient physical, biological, and institutional aspects of a real-world sys-
tem and then pose the following types of questions: Given these environmen-
tal characteristics, what do the human participants do? What could they do?
What should they do, given their various purposes?
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Researchers are increasingly using ABM to study coupled interactions
among human decisions and hydrological processes (Blair and Buytaert,
2016). Topics from studies with agricultural components have included: the
crop-yield effects of coordination among farmer associations (Lansing and
Kremer, 1993); the connection between upstream water management and the
viability of downstream farming (Becu et al., 2003); the effects of subsistence
farming on deforestation (Bithell and Brasington, 2009); and the impacts of
farming input costs, crop prices, carbon allowances, and biofuel adoption on
farmer behavior and stream nitrate loads (Ng et al., 2011). Nikolic et al.
(2013) note the importance of standardized communication among agents to
facilitate including agents from different sources.
Although the modeling of hydrological processes is difficult, the modeling
of human decisions and behaviors is arguably even more difficult. Spurred
by the work of Di Baldassarre et al. (2015), a recent debate (Montanari
, 2015) identifies several key issues that arise when attempts are made to
incorporate human decisions in socio-hydrological models. Citing several
case studies, Loucks (2015) highlights factors that greatly complicate the
prediction of human behavior, including an inability to formulate a set of
fundamental principles governing behavior, and the ever-present influence of
media, political entities, and cultural and social pressures. Fortunately, as
reviewed by An (2012), some of these issues are being addressed in ABM
studies, including participatory ABM studies in which stakeholders interact
directly with modelers in an ongoing development of an ABM.
The WACCShed platform contributes to socio-hydrological modeling in
two principal ways. First, it complements previous work on human decisions
and behaviors by allowing strategic game-theory interactions among humans
to be modeled within socio-hydrological environments. Although game the-
ory has been used in socio-ecological and water resource management studies
(Diekert, 2012; Madani and Hooshyar, 2014), it has not yet been included in
the study of socio-hydrological problems (Blair and Buytaert, 2016).
Second, WACCShed is a flexible, extensible, open source platform that
others can readily adapt to their own purposes. Noting that most ABMs de-
signed for environmental problems have been used only by their developers
(Papajorgji et al., 2004), Hu et al. (2015) implement their previously devel-
oped ABM (Ng et al., 2011) as a web-based application in a cloud computing
environment to ensure its accessibility and scalability. In a similar way, as
detailed in the following section, we simplify and adapt the OpenDanubia
framework developed by Barthel et al. (2008) to increase its general usability
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for socio-hydrological studies.
3. WACCShed Platform Architecture
3.1. Software Overview
This section provides an overview of the WACCShed platform architec-
ture. Covered aspects include relationship to existing software, platform
components, and application components. Detailed WACCShed design and
implementation aspects can be found in the documentation provided at the
WACCShed code and data repository site (Jie et al., 2016).
3.2. Adaptation from existing software
WACCShed is a Java software library that facilitates the systematic study
of coupled interactions among hydrological, climate and human decision-
making processes over time. The core of the platform builds upon Open-
Danubia, an open source software framework released by GLOWA-Danube
(Barthel et al., 2008; GLOWA-Danube Project, 2014). OpenDanubia was
developed to study the impacts of climate change on the Upper Danube wa-
tershed in Germany. However, its core system was designed with a great
degree of decoupling from application components, which allows for the im-
plementation of customized models.
In the process of adapting OpenDanubia to the specific demands of WACC-
Shed, we substantially reduced the number of Java packages while including
additional features. We next describe the main exclusions and extensions we
made to OpenDanubia.
To ensure portability and an ability to execute in remote High-Performance
Computing servers, WACCShed was developed as a console-based applica-
tion. To accomplish this, we detached the simulation from the data analysis
part of the system. Consequently, we do not include within WACCShed
the original OpenDanubia packages for Graphical User Interface and Data
Visualization tools.
Additionally, we extended OpenDanubia to allow for simulations to be run
as stand-alone applications. This was performed by embedding HyperSQL,
a Java-based Relational Database Management System (RDBMS), within
the platform. In contrast, OpenDanubia relies on an externally configured
MySQL for data management. One direct benefit of this embedding is the
ability to hold simulation data in RAM, minimizing slow input-output access
to hard disks. On the other hand, this embedding might be disadvantageous
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for applications with very large data sets. For this reason, we designed the
communication to RDBMS via an interface for which we provided HyperSQL
and MySQL implementations.
Finally, OpenDanubia supports parallel processing by implementing agents
as separate threads. However, there is no support for concurrent simulation
runs with different sets of parameter values. For this reason, OpenDanu-
bia cannot directly automate sensitivity analyses using its original packages.
To overcome this limitation, we developed software-controlled simulation pa-
rameters for WACCShed, thus allowing simultaneous execution of multiple
simulation configurations in separate threads under the same process.
3.3. WACCShed Platform Components
Platform components form the core of WACCShed and are responsible for
the underlying structure of simulations. Each component contains a collec-
tion of classes that together encapsulate one or more features of the system.
Specifically, these components implement simulation execution control, pa-
rameter setup, scheduling, and synchronization. They also provide the base
classes for application components and their communication interfaces. In
this subsection we briefly review the WACCShed platform components asso-
ciated with the main tasks in a simulation.
Values for the simulation parameters subject to sensitivity analysis, i.e.,
the treatment factors, are entered by the user into a main class that runs the
simulation. Each configuration of values for the treatment factors is stored
separately, allowing for parallel execution of different simulation cases. User-
entered values for the remaining parameters of the model are loaded into the
simulation from a hierarchical configuration structure of simple text files.
One root configuration file sets the data period and the geographic area for
the simulation and lists the application components. A separate metadata
file contains the parameter values related to the geographic area, such as the
surface area and the number of sub-basins.
An application component is a representation of a specific domain of a
model. Application components interact and synchronize with other parts of
the system by implementing a common cycle with four basic methods - get-
Data, compute, provide, and store - which change the state of the application
component when called. The application components are treated in separate
threads. However, they respect synchronization queues, and their execution
only proceeds after all other application components are in the same state
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of the cycle. Fig. 1 illustrates the states for a typical execution cycle of an
application component.
Figure 1: Typical WACCShed execution cycle implemented by an application component.
Application components do not have direct access to each other. Instead,
each application component X that provides data to an application com-
ponent Y has to implement an interface XtoY. This feature favors a low
coupling design, allowing application components to be developed with a
high degree of encapsulation.
Intermediate and final results of the simulation are communicated to a
database through a generic interface; it defines basic operations such as con-
nect, query, insert, and delete. The default and recommended implementa-
tion of the database interface is the HSQLDataBaseManager, which controls
an embedded instance of the HyperSQL RDBMS. A configurable MySQL
manager is also provided.
3.4. Illustration: Watershed Application Components
The watershed application, described in detail in Sections 4–6, is im-
plemented by means of five WACCShed application components: Climate,
Hydrology, Market, Farmland, and City. Figure 2 depicts the information
flow among these five components. Below we briefly discuss technical aspects
of this implementation.
The Climate component is responsible for providing precipitation data to
Hydrology, Farmland, and City. The precipitation information comes from a
fixed data set for three representative years indexed by level: low, moderate,
or high. The Climate component is configured to operate in hourly steps
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Figure 2: WACCShed watershed application components and their information flows im-
plemented via communication interfaces.
in simulation time. Hence, the precipitation data table is fed with new
information for each simulated hour during each simulation run.
The Hydrology component is also set to hourly time steps. This com-
ponent handles the calculations associated with hydrological processes. It
communicates to City the water discharge rate into the city based on precip-
itation data and land attributes.
The Market component is based on a fixed data set for representative
years. It provides information on input costs and crop prices to Farmland and
City. It is configured to daily time steps, as are all remaining components.
The Farmland component encapsulates the decision-making activities of
Farmer agents with respect to land allocation, consumption, and savings
decisions. The Farmland component allows a user to implement multiple
Farmer agents with heterogeneous data, attributes, and methods.1 The
Farmer agents compute decisions using information on precipitation, input
costs, crop prices, and subsidy rates. The Farmland component then pro-
vides data on land use to Hydrology and City and data on Farmer financial
states to City. The Farmland component also stores decisions, outcomes,
and state changes in the database. Other processes associated with farming,
such as harvest yield, are also included in the Farmland component.
The City component encapsulates the decision-making activities of a City
Manager agent with respect to budget allocation decisions. It also encapsu-
1For clarity of exposition, the particular watershed application reported in the current
study implements a single representative Farmer agent.
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lates the process determining the quality effectiveness attribute of a Levee
agent, where quality effectiveness measures the ability to mitigate city flood
damage. The City component processes information from all other applica-
tion components, generates a budget allocation decision, and communicates
the subsidy portion of this budget allocation decision to the Farmland compo-
nent. The City component also stores decisions, outcomes, and state changes
in the database.
The spatial structure for the watershed application is a watershed region
partitioned into a user-specified number of sub-basins. Climate, Hydrology,
and Farmland processes are specific to each sub-basin, while Market prices
are common across all sub-basins. For the particular watershed application
reported in the current study, the number of sub-basins is set to one.
4. Watershed Application: Overview
4.1. Purpose
The watershed application is a relatively simple test case that demon-
strates, in concrete terms, the capabilities and use of the WACCShed plat-
form. The application highlights, in particular, how WACCShed permits the
study of watersheds as dynamic coupled natural and human systems with hu-
mans modeled as strategically interacting decision makers subject to physical
and financial constraints.
4.2. Agents, State Variables, and Scales
The watershed application is an agent-based modeling of an agricultural
watershed that operates over successive simulated years. The modeled wa-
tershed consists of the collection of hierarchically organized agents depicted
in Fig. 3. Note that the Farmland, City, Market, Climate, and Hydrology
agents depicted in Fig. 3 correspond to the five WACCShed application com-
ponents depicted in Fig. 2.
The base agent for the watershed application is the Watershed World
populated by physical, institutional, and decision-making agents. Specifi-
cally, the Watershed World has a Basin (geographical area) divided between
Farmland and a City. Farmland has a decision-making agent called a Farmer.
City has a decision-making agent called a City Manager plus a physical Levee
agent for protection against city flood damage. The Watershed World has
two instances of a Market agent: namely, an intermediate-goods market for
the inputs (seed and chemicals) needed for the production of corn as well as
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Figure 3: Agent hierarchy for the watershed application. Down-pointing arrows denote
“has a” relationships, and up-pointing arrows denote “is a” relationships.
a final-goods market for the sale of corn. The Watershed World also has a
Climate agent that encapsulates processes for the determination of annual
precipitation patterns, and a Hydrology agent that encapsulates processes
determining the relationship between water and land.
As detailed in Tesfatsion (2016a), the state of a modeled system at any
given time is a characterization of all system aspects deemed by the modeler
to be relevant for a specified purpose. For an agent-based model, such as
the watershed application, the state of the modeled system at any given
time consists of the states of its constituent agents. In turn, the state of an
agent at any given time consists of the agent’s internal data, attributes, and
methods (functions, subroutines,...). These state aspects further subdivide
into aspects that remain fixed over time and aspects that can change over
time, hereafter referred to as fixed and variable aspects respectively. In the
watershed application the variable state aspects of agents are updated (as
appropriate) every time a decision or event is realized.
The fixed and variable state aspects of the Watershed World and Basin
agents in Fig. 3 consist of the fixed and variable state aspects of their con-
stituent agents as identified by “has a” relationships. Summary descriptions
of the fixed and variable state aspects for each other agent in the water-
shed application are listed in Table 1. Nomenclature tables providing lists of
symbols, abbreviated definitions, and units for these fixed and variable state
aspects are provided in Appendix A.
Four aspects of Table 1 warrant clarification. First, a curve number (CN)
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Table 1: Fixed and variable state aspects for watershed application agents
Agent Fixed State Aspects Variable State Aspects
Farmland Land area; planting density; curve numbers for
bare soil, retention-land, & cropland at
different growth stages; harvest yield
function; Farmer inhabitant
Farmer Preferences; decision method for land Information; money holdings
allocation, consumption, & savings
City Land area; levee; curve number; city flood
damage function; city inhabitants;
City Manager inhabitant
City Manager Annual budget; budget allocation method Information
Levee Levee quality update method Levee quality
Market Market type; possible prices & probabilities
Seed/Chem Market Market type (corn-production inputs);
possible input prices & probabilities
Corn Market Market type (corn); possible
corn prices & probabilities
Climate Possible precipitation patterns & probabilities
Hydrology HEC-HMS (Hydrologic Modeling System)
mapping land area, land usage, curve
numbers, & precipitation patterns into
city peak water discharge rates
is a hydrological measure expressing relative water runoff for land with dif-
ferent types of cover. Second, in this study, water retention land is defined
to be land for which management practices result in higher water retention
(lower water runoff), hence a lower CN , than bare soil, fallow land, or crop-
land with a mature crop cover. Third, as detailed more carefully in Appendix
D, the CN for cropland decreases over the growing season as the cropland
varies from no coverage (bare soil) to coverage by a mature crop. Fourth,
information is included as a variable state aspect of the Farmer and City
Manager because their information is continually updated to include all past
decisions and environmental event realizations.
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Figure 4: Interactions among the agents in the Watershed World
4.3. Process Overview and Scheduling
The interactions among the agents populating the Watershed World are
depicted in Fig. 4. During each simulated year the Watershed World experi-
ences a randomly determined amount of precipitation that affects farmland
and city runoff as well as cropland yield. In addition, during each simu-
lated year a randomly determined input cost is determined in the market
for seed and chemicals and a randomly determined corn price is realized in
the corn market. These input costs and prices affect the profitability of corn
production within the Watershed World.
The Farmer seeks to achieve and sustain a high level of personal wel-
fare over time through appropriate annual allocations of her farmland among
cropland, water-retention land, and fallow land. The City Manager attempts
to maintain and increase city social welfare over time through appropriate
annual allocations of the city budget among city social services, levee invest-
ment, and water-retention land subsidy payments to the Farmer.
Each simulated year t = 1, 2, . . . in the Watershed World is divided into
seasonal subperiods t1, . . . , t7 during which either a decision is taken or an
environmental event is realized; see Table 2. The variable state aspects of
each agent are updated (as appropriate) after each decision or event realiza-
tion. Subperiod tk denotes the time interval [t:k, t:(k+ 1)), with t:1 = t and
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t:8 = t+ 1. Thus, year t covers the time interval [t:1, t:8) = [t, t+ 1).
Table 2: Timeline for year-t decisions and events
Jan Feb March April-Sept Oct Nov Dec
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7
In subperiod t1 (January) of year t, an input cost ($/acre) for corn plant-
ing is realized for the year. In subperiod t2 (February) the City Manager
allocates the annual city budget among three portions to enhance city social
welfare, expressed as a weighted combination of city social services and the
mitigation of city flood damage. The three budget portions are for city social-
services, retention land subsidies, and levee investment. The City Manager
then sets the subsidy rate for retention land for the current year. In making
these decisions, the City Manager takes into account their likely effect on the
Farmer’s subsequent land-allocation decision in subperiod t3.
In subperiod t3 (March), given the input cost realized in t1 and the
retention-land subsidy rate set in t2, the Farmer allocates her farmland among
cropland, retention land, and fallow land in pursuit of consumption and sav-
ings goals. The Farmer immediately receives a subsidy payment from the City
Manager for her retention-land portion. In subperiod t4 (April–September)
the Farmer uses her money holdings to purchase the inputs needed to plant
her cropland. She then plants seeds and tends to her cropland.
In subperiod t5 (October) the Farmer’s yield (bushels/acre) from her
harvested crop is determined by the precipitation pattern, i.e., by the rainfall
realized from January 1 through October 15. The precipitation pattern,
together with the Farmer’s land allocation, also determines the peak water
discharge rate into the city. This discharge rate, together with the quality
of the city’s levee, determines city flood damage. The City Manager then
calculates the amount of city flood damage mitigated by his expenditures on
retention-land subsidies and levee investment, which in turn permits him to
calculate city social welfare for year t.
At the beginning of subperiod t6 (November) a corn price is realized in
the corn market. During subperiods t6–t7 (November–December) the Farmer
sells corn in the corn market and retains (and/or buys) corn for her own
consumption, conditional on a savings target. The Farmer calculates her
year-t welfare by the utility (benefit) she obtains from her own consumption.
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At the end of subperiod t7 (December 31st), the Farmer and City Manager
take stock of all that has occurred during year t and update their states
accordingly. A new year t+ 1 then commences.
5. Watershed Application: Design Concepts
5.1. Design concept overview
The design concept category for the ODD protocol lists eleven elements
(Grimm et al., 2010a, Table 1). The first-listed element is basic princi-
ples, characterized as general concepts, theories, hypotheses, or modeling
approaches that underly a model’s design. The ten remaining elements con-
cern the specific manner in which processes are modeled.
The basic principles underlying the watershed application are explained in
Section 5.2, and the ten remaining design-concept elements for the watershed
application are explained in Section 5.3.
5.2. First ODD Design Concept: Basic Principles
WACCShed is an agent-based computational platform, and the water-
shed application—implemented by means of this platform—is an agent-based
model. Specifically, the watershed application is an instance of agent-based
computational economics (ACE ) modeling, the computational modeling of
economic processes as open-ended dynamic systems of interacting agents.
Although the precise meaning of “agent-based modeling” continues to be
debated in the literature, seven basic modeling principles have been devel-
oped for ACE that carefully distinguish it from other types of modeling and
that highlight its particular relevance for the study of watersheds as dynamic
coupled natural and human systems.
The seven basic modeling principles underlying ACE model design are
presented and explained in Table 3 as BMP1 through BMP7. Taken to-
gether, these seven principles express the fundamental goal of many agent-
based modelers: namely, to be able to study real-world systems as historical
processes unfolding through time, driven solely by their own internal dynam-
ics (Tesfatsion, 2016a, Sections 8-11).
Three additional basic modeling principles specific to the watershed ap-
plication are listed in Table 3 as BMP8 through BMP10. These three prin-
ciples reflect a concern that physical and financial feasibility constraints be
carefully modeled to provide a proper scaffolding for the study of human
decision-making processes.
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Table 3: Basic modeling principles (BMPs) underlying the watershed application
BMP BMP Aspect BMP Description
BMP1 Agent Definition An agent is a software entity within a computational
world able to act over time on the basis of its own state,
i.e., its own internal data, attributes, and methods.
BMP2 Agent Scope Agents can represent individuals, social groupings
institutions, biological entities, and/or physical entities.
BMP3 Agent Local Constructivity The decision-making process undertaken by a
decision-making agent at any given time must be entirely
expressible as a function of the agent’s state at that time.
BMP4 Agent Autonomy Coordination of agent interactions cannot be externally
imposed by means of free-floating restrictions; that is,
by means of modeler-imposed restrictions not embodied
within agent states.
BMP5 System Constructivity The state of the modeled system at any given time
consists of the collection of agent states at that time.
BMP6 System Historicity Given initial agent states, all subsequent events in the
modeled system are determined solely by agent interactions.
BMP7 Modeler as Culture-Dish The role of the modeler is limited to the setting of
Experimenter initial agent states and to the non-pertubational
observation of model outcomes.
BMP8 Empirically-Based The HEC-HMS is used to model relationships among
Hydrological Modeling precipitation, land curve numbers, and water runoff.
BMP9 Stock-Flow Consistency Stocks (physical/financial assets) are carefully modeled
as accumulations of flows (net investment/savings).
BMP10 Balance-Sheet Accounting Budget constraints are fully respected; every purchase
is backed by actual purchasing power at the time
the purchase is made.
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The HEC-HMS referred to in BMP8 is the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers Hydrologic Modeling System, a well-tested and widely applied system
within hydrology and engineering communities (Feldman, 2000; Scharffen-
berg, 2013). A more detailed discussion of the HEC-HMS can be found in
Tesfatsion et al. (2016, Section 3.2).
5.3. Ten Additional ODD Design Concepts
The ten remaining ODD design concepts concern the specific modeling
of agent interaction and decision-making processes and the outcomes that
result from these modeled processes. Since these aspects of the watershed
application are covered at length in subsequent sections, only brief summaries
are provided here. Closely related concepts are grouped together for clarity.
Emergence: Farmer and city social welfare outcomes arise over time from
the state-conditioned decisions and interactions of the agents populat-
ing the modeled watershed. A key concern for effective local governance
is whether these welfare outcomes are aligned, in the sense that they
move up and down together in response to changing conditions, or are
in conflict in the sense that a gain for one is a loss for the other.
Sensing and Adaptation: The Farmer and City Manager are goal-directed
agents that attempt to adapt their behavior optimally in response to
changed state conditions, including changes to information, physical
conditions, and financial conditions.
Stochasticity: Input costs, precipitation, and corn prices are modeled as
random variables whose annual realizations are drawn from stationary
empirically-based probability distributions. Also, the decision methods
used by the Farmer and the City Manager include the use of pseudo-
random number generators to select randomly among decisions per-
ceived to be equally desirable.
Objectives: The long-term objective of the Farmer is to achieve and sustain
an optimal consumption level over time. The long-term objective of the
City Manager is to maximize social welfare for his city’s inhabitants
over time.
Learning and Prediction: Due to computational constraints, the Farmer
and City Manager attempt to achieve their long-term objectives by
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solving successive decision problems that only require the expected net
benefits associated with alternative decisions to be calculated over short
planning horizons.
Interaction: Coupled interactions occur among human decision making,
environment, and market processes during each simulated year. The
budget allocation decision of the City Manager affects the income earn-
ing opportunities available to the Farmer, which in turn influence the
Farmer’s land allocation decision; and it also determines levee quality
and the amount of expenditure on city social services. The subsequent
realization of a precipitation pattern then determines city flooding and
hence city social welfare; and the subsequent realization of a corn price
(given earlier realizations for input costs and precipitation) determines
the Farmer’s corn consumption (welfare) as well as her money holdings
for the start of the subsequent year.
Collectives: The City Manager is a collective only in the following fiduciary
sense: he acts on behalf of his city’s inhabitants in an attempt to ensure
their social welfare.
Observation/Output Data: Three treatment factors are tested: Farmer
decision method, Farmer savings target, and levee quality effectiveness.
For each tested configuration of these three treatment factors, annual
Farmer and city social welfare outcomes are reported for twenty sim-
ulated years under thirty-one different environmental scenarios. Addi-
tional outcomes (e.g., time series for City Manager and Farmer alloca-
tion decisions) are reported in Tesfatsion et al. (2016).
6. Watershed Application: Details
6.1. Initialization
Apart from treatment factors and random event realizations, all exoge-
nous (externally determined) variables for the watershed application are
maintained at fixed values for all of the sensitivity findings reported in this
study. These fixed values are provided in Table A.5 in Appendix A.
The fixed state aspects of the Farmer and City Manager, set at the ini-
tial time 1:1, include complete structural information about the physical and
economic aspects of the Watershed World relevant for their decision making.
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This information includes knowledge of the probability distributions govern-
ing random environmental event realizations. In addition, the City Manager
at time 1:1 knows the Farmer’s decision method and initial money holdings.
6.2. Input Data
Annual environmental events (input costs, precipitation, corn prices) in
the watershed application are modeled as realizations drawn from indepen-
dent, stationary, empirically-based probability distributions. These distribu-
tions are specified as follows:2
 Input Cost Distribution: Three possible realizations (low, mod, high)
for annual corn-production input costs, with probabilities 25%, 50%,
and 25%, respectively, are estimated based on 2005-2013 data for seed
and chemical costs assuming corn-following-corn (ISU, 2015a).
 Precipitation Distribution: Three possible realizations (low, mod, high)
for annual precipitation (hourly rainfall depth in inches), with proba-
bilities 25%, 50%, and 25%, respectively, are estimated based on 1997-
2013 rainfall data for Ames, Iowa (IEM, 2015).
 Corn Price Distribution: Three possible realizations (low, mod, high)
for the annual corn price, with probabilities 25%, 50%, and 25%, re-
spectively, are estimated based on 1997-2013 corn price data (ISU,
2015b).
Making use of these independent stationary probability distributions for
annual input costs, precipitation, and corn prices, we constructed an en-
semble S consisting of thirty-one potential environmental scenarios s, each
covering twenty simulated years, for use in all reported sensitivity studies for
the watershed application. Each scenario s takes the form
scenario s =
(
(xs1, y
s
1, z
s
1), (x
s
2, y
s
2, z
s
2), . . . , (x
s
20, y
s
20, z
s
20)
)
(1)
where:
xsj = input cost (low, mod, or high) in year j under scenario s
ysj = precipitation (low, mod, or high) in year j under scenario s
zsj = corn price (low, mod, or high) in year j under scenario s
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Figure 5: Probability distribution for environmental scenarios in the watershed application
As detailed in Appendix B, the thirty-one scenarios in the ensemble S
have unique scenario numbers ranging from -15 to +15. A scenario’s as-
signed number represents its Hamming-measure distance from the normal
scenario 0 characterized by moderate input costs, moderate precipitation,
and moderate corn prices in each of the twenty simulated years. Scenarios
with negative scenario numbers tend to deviate from scenario 0 on the low
side, and scenarios with positive scenario numbers tend to deviate from sce-
nario 0 on the high side. The bell-shaped probability distribution function
calculated for these thirty-one scenarios is depicted in Fig. 5.
6.3. Submodels: Process Details
The Watershed World is a discrete-time state space model in initial value
form (Tesfatsion, 2016a). Starting from initial conditions, set by the mod-
eler, all dynamic outcomes in the Watershed World are driven solely by
the actions and interactions of its constituent physical, institutional, and
decision-making agents.
More precisely, recall from Section 4.3 that each simulated year t in the
watershed application is divided into seasonal subperiods tk, k = 1, . . . , 7,
where tk denotes the time interval [t:k,t:(k + 1)). Let xt:k denote the state
of the Watershed World at the beginning subperiod tk. Let ωt:k denote the
realizations for all random events occurring during subperiod tk, which could
include an input cost, a precipitation pattern, a corn price, and/or out-
comes from pseudo-random number devices employed by decision-making
agents to resolve choice among equally-preferred decision options. Let dt:k
= d(xt:k, ωt:k) denote all decisions made by the Farmer and City Manager
2See Table A.5 for the low, moderate, and high values set for each random variable.
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during subperiod t:k, which are dependent in part or in whole on xt:k and
ωt:k; and let yt:k = y(xt:k, ωt:k, dt:k) denote all other outcomes during subpe-
riod t:k, which are dependent in part or in whole on xt:k, ωt:k, and dt:k: e.g.,
harvest yield.
Then, making use of the functional forms for dt:k and yt:k, the motion
over time of the Watershed World state can be expressed as follows. For any
subperiod tk:
xt:(k+1) = S(xt:k, ωt:k, dt:k, yt:k) ≡ F
(
xt:k, ωt:k, d(xt:k, ωt:k)
)
; (2)
x1:1 = x
o
1:1 (exogenously given) (3)
This form indicates that the driving forces determining the Watershed World
state xt:(k+1) at time t:(k + 1) are the previous state xt:k, the random event
realizations ωt:k, and the manner in which the Farmer and City Manager
determine their decisions dt:k as a function d(xt:k, ωt:k) of xt:k and ωt:k.
This section provides detailed descriptions of the processes determining
ωt:k, yt:k, and xt:(k+1) for each subperiod tk, conditional on dt:k, for k = 1, . . . , 7
and for any simulated year t ≥ 1. Nomenclature tables giving symbols, verbal
definitions, units, and values (where appropriate) for all variables appearing
in these descriptions can be found in Appendix A. Some technical aspects
of these descriptions are relegated to Appendix B through Appendix F.
The physical and financial feasibility conditions constraining the Farmer
and City Manager decisions dt:k are taken into account in these process de-
scriptions. However, since the decision methods d(xt:k, ωt:k) used by the
Farmer and City Manager to select their decisions dt:k are key treatment fac-
tors for the ensuing sensitivity study, the precise formulation of these decision
methods is deferred until the presentation of the sensitivity study design in
Section 7.
Subperiod t1 (January): An input cost per acre is realized.
At the beginning of subperiod t1 = [t:1,t:2) the Farmer and City Manager are
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in states XFt:1 and X
CM
t:1 .
3 An input cost per acre is then realized, as follows:
InputCostt:1 = Input cost ($/acre)
= Per-acre cost of seed and chemicals
needed to plant cropland (4)
This modeling of input costs assumes a fixed planting density (seeds/acre).
Thus, the Farmer does not attempt to modify her input costs ($/acre) by
varying her planting density.
Subperiod t2 (February): City Manager allocates city budget.
At the beginning of subperiod t2 = [t:2,t:3) the City Manager allocates the
city budget Bt:1 into a city social service expenditure portion, a subsidy
portion, and a levee investment portion. This budget allocation is determined
by the values the City Manager selects for the subsidy and levee investment
percentages (st:2, `t:2), which must lie in the following decision domain:
DCM = {(s, `) | 0 ≤ s, 0 ≤ `, s+ ` ≤ 1} (5)
The percentages (st:2, `t:2) determine the city budget allocation as follows:
RetSubposs(st:2) = st:2Bt:1
= Dollars set aside for retention-land subsidy spending (6)
τt:2 = τ(st:2) = [RetSub
poss(st:2)]/[r
maxAF ]
= Retention-land subsidy rate ($/acre) set for year t (7)
LevInv(`t:2) = `t:2Bt:1
= Dollars set aside for levee repair and improvement (8)
3The decision processes undertaken by the Farmer and City Manager at any time
t:k during year t depend on their updated time-(t:k) states XFt:k and X
CM
t:k ; recall from
Section 4.2 that the information included in these states is continuously updated to include
all past decisions and environmental event realizations. However, for clarity of exposition,
this dependence is not explicitly indicated in the notation used below to describe decision
processes.
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SocServposs(st:2, `t:2) = [1− st:2 − `t:2]Bt:1
= Dollars set aside for city social service spending (9)
In (7), AF denotes the total amount of farmland in the watershed, and
rmax ∈ [0, 1] is a watershed policy parameter giving the maximum percentage
of AF that the Farmer is allowed to allocate as retention land.
The City Manager’s budget allocation in turn determines levee quality
for year t, as follows:
LQt:2 = LQ(`t:2) = [1− δ]LQ(t−1):2 + gLevInv(`t:2)
= Levee quality for year t (10)
In (10), g (ft/$) maps dollars of levee investment into levee quality (height),
δ is a depreciation rate, and the levee quality LQ(t−1):2 determined at time
(t − 1):2 for year t − 1 is known to the City Manager from inclusion in his
state XCMt:1 .
Subperiod t3 (March): The Farmer allocates her farmland.
At the beginning of subperiod t3 = [t:3,t:4) the Farmer allocates her farm-
land AF among cropland, retention land, and fallow land. This allocation is
determined by the values the Farmer selects for the cropland and retention-
land percentages (ct:3,rt:3), which must lie in the following decision domain:
DF (rmax) = {(c, r) | 0 ≤ c, 0 ≤ r ≤ rmax, c+ r ≤ 1} (11)
The percentages (ct:3,rt:3) determine the Farmer’s land allocation as follows:
Acrop(ct:3) = ct:3A
F = Farmer’s cropland for year t (12)
Aret(rt:3) = rt:3A
F = Farmer’s retention land for year t (13)
Afal(ct:3, rt:3) = [1− ct:3 − rt:3]AF
= Farmer’s fallow land for year t (14)
The percentages (ct:3,rt:3) also determine the following additional outcomes
at time t:3:
RetSubact(τt:2rt:3) = τt:2rt:3A
F
= F’s actual retention-land subsidy receipts ($) for year t (15)
SocServact(τt:2rt:3, `t:2) = Bt:1 − RetSubact(τt:2rt:3)− LevInv(`t:2)
= CM’s actual city social service spending ($) for year t (16)
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The Farmer’s money holdings at time t:3 are thus given by
Mt:3(τt:2rt:3) = Mt:1 + RetSub
act(τt:2rt:3) ≥ 0 (17)
The Farmer does not want to waste resources by designating more farmland
as cropland than she can afford to plant. Since a realization InputCostt:1
($/acre) for year-t input costs has already been observed at time t:1, the
Farmer can ensure non-wastage of cropland by imposing the following addi-
tional constraint on her choice of the percentages (ct:3, rt:3) at time t:3:
InputCostt:1 · ct:3AF = InputCostt:1 · Acrop(ct:3)
≤ Mt:3(τt:2rt:3) (18)
Condition (18) and the requirement ct:3 ≤ 1 impose the following upper
bound on ct:3:
ct:3 ≤ cmax(τt:2rt:3) ≡ min{1, Mt:3(τt:2rt:3)
InputCostt:1 · AF
} (19)
Subperiod t4 (April-September): The Farmer buys inputs, plants
seed, and tends her cropland.
At the beginning of subperiod t4 = [t:4,t:5) the Farmer uses her money hold-
ings Mt:3(τt:2rt:3) to purchase all inputs needed to plant A
crop(ct:3). The
Farmer’s money holdings at time t:4, after all input purchases have been
made, are given by
Mt:4(ct:3, τt:2rt:3) = Mt:3(τt:2rt:3)− InputCostt:1Acrop(ct:3) ≥ 0 (20)
Subperiod t5 (October): A precipitation pattern is fully realized,
determining city social welfare and the Farmer’s mature corn crop
A precipitation pattern Precipt:5 is fully realized during subperiod t5 =
[t:5,t:6) consisting of the hourly rainfall depth occurring from January 1
through October 15 of year t. This precipitation pattern determines the
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following outcomes:
Ht:5 = H(Precipt:5) = Harvest yield (bushels/acre) for year t (21)
CCropt:5(ct:3) = Ht:5 · Acrop(ct:3) = Corn crop (bushels) for year t (22)
Qp,t:5(ct:3, rt:3) = Qp
(
Precipt:5, A
crop(ct:3), A
ret(rt:3), A
fal(ct:3, rt:3)
)
= Peak water discharge rate into the city (ft3/s ≡ cfs) (23)
FDt:5(`t:2, ct:3, rt:3) = FD
(
LQ(`t:2), Qp,t:5(ct:3, rt:3)
)
= City flood damage ($) during year t (24)
CSWt:5(τt:2, `t:2, ct:3, rt:3)
= CSW
(
SocServact(τt:2rt:3, `t:2), FDt:5(`t:2, ct:3, rt:3)
)
= City social welfare ($) for year t (25)
More precisely, CSWt:5 is a weighted average of city social services ($) and
city flood-damage mitigation ($) given by
CSWt:5 = SocServ
act
t:3 + ψ ·
[
FDmax − FDt:5
]
(26)
In (26), ψ is a trade-off parameter, FDmax is a parameter in the city flood
damage function (24) that denotes maximum avoidable city flood damage,
FDt:5 denotes actual city flood damage, and [FD
max − FDt:5] measures
avoided city flood damage. Detailed specifications for the harvest yield func-
tion (21) and the city flood-damage function (24) are provided in Appendix
C and Appendix D, respectively.
Subperiod t6 (November): A corn price is realized.
At the beginning of subperiod t6 = [t:6,t:7) a corn price, CPricet:6 ($/bushel),
is realized in the corn market. This corn price in turn determines
Valuecropt:6 (ct:3) = CPricet:6 · CCropt:5(ct:3)
= Market value ($) of the Farmer’s corn crop (27)
Subperiod t7 (December): Farmer welfare is determined.
At the beginning of subperiod t7 = [t:7,t:8), the Farmer’s possible money
holdings if she sells all of her crop in the corn market are
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) = Mt:4(ct:3, τt:2rt:3) + Value
crop
t:6 (ct:3) (28)
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The Farmer sells corn in the corn market at price CPricet:6 and retains
(and/or buys) corn in amount ConsFt:7 to consume for herself. This deter-
mines her year-t welfare, measured by the utility (benefit) she obtains from
the consumption of ConsFt:7. This utility-of-consumption is measured by:
UOCt:7 = u(Cons
F
t:7) = ln(Cons
F
t:7 − C¯F +D) (29)
where the Farmer’s subsistence consumption level C¯F is set at 125 bushels
and the Farmer’s risk tolerance parameter D is set at 126 bushels.4 The
Farmer’s consumption level ConsFt:7 is determined as follows:
 If the Farmer is unable to attain at least her subsistence consumption
level C¯F , i.e., if CPricet:6 · C¯F > Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3), she then consumes
ConsFt:7 =
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3)
CPricet:6
< C¯F (30)
Unable to remain in the farming business, she exits the watershed at
the end of subperiod t7 and all of her farmland reverts to fallow land.
 If CPricet:6 · C¯F ≤ Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3), then the Farmer selects a sav-
ings level SFt:7 and a consumption level Cons
F
t:7 subject to the following
budget, subsistence, and savings-target constraints:
SFt:7 + CPricet:6 · ConsFt:7 = Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) (31)
ConsFt:7 ≥ C¯F (32)
SFt:7 ≥ SFo (33)
where, if necessary, the Farmer ratchets down her initial savings target
SFo ≥ 0 until all three constraints can be satisfied.5 Thus, the Farmer’s
money holdings for the start of year t+ 1 are
M(t+1):1 = S
F
t:7 (34)
4These settings for C¯F and D ensure that (29) is well-defined even when ConsFt:7 = 0.
Note that D = −u′(C¯F )/u′′(C¯F ). As detailed in Tesfatsion et al. (2016, Section 7.3),
within economics the inverse expression, −u′′(C)/u′(C), is known as the Arrow-Pratt
Measure of Risk Aversion; it provides a proxy measure for the aversion to risk displayed
by an (expected) utility maximizing consumer at a particular consumption level C.
5This ratcheting process is detailed in Appendix E.
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At the end of subperiod t7, the Farmer (if still present in the watershed) is
in state XF(t+1):1. This updated state includes her previous state X
F
t:1, a record
of all decisions and environmental event realizations she observed during year
t, and her money holdings (34) for the start of year t+ 1.
At the end of subperiod t7 the City Manager is in state X
CM
(t+1):1. This
updated state includes his previous state XCMt:1 , a record of all decisions
and environmental event realizations he observed during year t, and the city
budget B(t+1):1 for year t+ 1.
7. Sensitivity Design for the Watershed Application
7.1. Sensitivity Design Overview
The sensitivity design for the watershed application focuses on welfare
outcomes. Simulation experiments are conducted to explore how Farmer
welfare and city social welfare vary in response to changes in three treatment
factors pertaining to the risk management practices of the Farmer and the
City Manager.
Farming is a risky business. Cropland is a risky asset because positive
net earnings are not assured. Poor precipitation conditions (too much or too
little rain) can diminish harvest yield, and poor market conditions (input
costs too high and/or corn prices too low) can lead to small or even negative
profit margins. In contrast, water-retention land and fallow land are sure-
thing assets: the Farmer is guaranteed to receive a non-negative subsidy rate
on each retention acre and a zero return rate on each fallow acre. However,
the Farmer has no safe harbor; she must secure a sufficient return on her
farmland to meet her annual consumption needs C¯F in order to sustain her
farming business in the watershed over time.
Consequently, the Farmer’s land allocation decision is an important re-
flection of her stance towards risk. A key treatment factor considered in
the sensitivity design, called the Decision Treatment, determines the decision
method annually used by the Farmer to determine her land allocation as well
as her consumption and savings levels. The first tested decision method is
annual maximization of expected consumption; the Farmer acts as if normal
(average) market and precipitation conditions will prevail each year, ignoring
the risk that adverse events could bankrupt her farm and force her exit from
the watershed. The second tested decision method is annual maximization of
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expected utility-of-consumption (UOC), where the concave curvature of the
UOC function induces risk-averse consideration of possible adverse events.
The second considered treatment factor is the savings-target scale factor
θo. This scale factor determines the magnitude of the Farmer’s initial savings
target SFo = SF (θo), i.e., her planned annual precautionary savings against
future risks. The magnitude of this scale factor thus reflects the extent
to which the Farmer recognizes the approximate nature of her short-term
decision problems in relation to her longer-term goal: to survive and prosper
as a watershed farmer over multiple years.
The third considered treatment factor is Levee Quality Effectiveness (LQE).
The LQE parameter measures the effectiveness of city levee investments as a
means for mitigating city flood damage. All else equal, a larger LQE setting
implies a smaller need for the City Manager to make subsidy payments to
the Farmer for retention-land set-aside, which reduces Farmer income and
increases Farmer bankruptcy risk.
For each treatment-factor configuration, thirty-one simulation runs are
conducted, one for each of the thirty-one environmental scenarios s whose
construction is explained in Section 6.2. Since each scenario s spans twenty
simulated years, each run also spans twenty simulated years. All other ex-
ogenous (externally determined) aspects of the watershed application are
maintained at fixed values for all of the sensitivity findings reported in this
study; see Table A.5.
7.2. Decision Treatments
Two decision methods are considered for the Farmer: F-OFF (expected
consumption maximization) and F-ON (expected utility-of-consumption max-
imization). Only one decision method is considered for the City Manager:
CM-ON (expected city social welfare maximization). Each decision method
includes the use of a pseudo-random number generator to select randomly
among equally-preferred decision options.
More precisely, as detailed in Appendix E and Appendix F, the following
two decision treatments are tested:
Decision Treatment 1: (F-OFF, CM-ON)
 The Farmer at time t:3, during each successive year t, selects a land
allocation (ct:3, rt:3) from her decision domain (11) that maximizes her
state-conditioned expected money holdings E[Mposst:7 (c, τt:2r) |XFt:3] for
the start of time t:7. The Farmer at time t:7 then consumes as much
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as possible, conditional on the budget, subsistence, and savings-target
constraints (31) through (33).
 The City Manager at time t:2, during each successive year t, selects a
budget allocation (st:2, `t:2) from his decision domain (5) that maximizes
state-conditioned expected city social welfare E[CSWt:5 |XCMt:2 ] for year
t. This maximization takes into account how the retention-land subsidy
rate τt:2 = τ(st:2) resulting from the selected budget allocation will
affect the Farmer’s land allocation at time t:3.
Decision Treatment 2: (F-ON, CM-ON)
 The Farmer at time t:3, during each successive year t, selects a land
allocation (ct:3, rt:3) from her decision domain (11), as well as con-
sumption and savings levels ConsFt:7 and Sav
F
t:7, to maximize her state-
conditioned expected utility-of-consumption E[u(ConsFt:7) |XFt:3] for year
t conditional on the budget, subsistence, and savings-target constraints
(31) through (33).
 The City Manager behaves the same as in Decision Treatment 1.
7.3. Farmer Savings-Target Treatments
Under each tested Farmer decision method, F-OFF or F-ON, the Farmer’s
initial savings target SFo appearing in her savings-target constraint (33) is
given by
SFo = SF (θo) = θo · E[CPrice] · C¯F (35)
In (35), the savings-target scale factor θo is a unit-free non-negative scalar
that affects the magnitude of SFo, E[CPrice] is the stationary expectation
for the annual corn price, and C¯F is the Farmer’s annual subsistence corn
consumption level. Thus, the initial savings target (35) is anchored by an
estimate of the money holdings the Farmer would need to ensure her subsis-
tence consumption for the next year in the absence of any new income.
The value for θo is systematically varied across computational experi-
ments as a treatment factor. Results for the following three θo settings are
reported in this study:
Low Savings-Target Scale Factor: θo = 100
Moderate Savings-Target Scale Factor: θo = 5,000
High Savings-Target Scale Factor: θo = 20,000
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7.4. Levee Quality Effectiveness Treatments
As detailed in Appendix D, the city flood damage function FD(LQ,Qp)
determines city flood damage as a function of city levee quality LQ and the
peak water discharge rate Qp into the city. Among the parameters charac-
terizing this function is a shift factor LQE representing levee quality effec-
tiveness: For any given LQ, a higher setting for LQE shifts the flood damage
function to the right, increasing the range of Qp values for which city flood
damage remains low. Results for the following two LQE settings are reported
in this study:
Low Levee Quality Effectiveness: LQE = 51.5 cfs/ft
High Levee Quality Effectiveness: LQE = 98.2 cfs/ft
8. Illustrative Welfare Outcomes for the Watershed Application
8.1. Welfare outcome overview
The welfare outcomes reported in this section for the watershed appli-
cation are for illustrative purposes only. Consequently, discussions of these
outcomes are kept brief. A more comprehensive report of findings for the
watershed application is provided in Tesfatsion et al. (2016, Sections 6-7).
8.2. Welfare Metrics
Farmer welfare (utility-of-consumption) is measured by total UOC (29)
attained over twenty simulated years, and city social welfare is measured by
total CSW (26) attained over twenty simulated years. Outcomes for total
UOC and total CSW are reported in two forms: (i) in expected form, as
a probability-weighted average across the thirty-one possible environmental
scenarios, together with dispersion ranges; and (ii) differentiated by environ-
mental scenario.
Regarding form (i), bar charts are used to report overall expected values
and dispersion ranges for total UOC and total CSW under various treat-
ments. Bar height indicates expected value, and the vertical line centered at
each bar height depicts the dispersion range for the expected value, deter-
mined as plus or minus one standard deviation around the expected value.
Regarding form (ii), each scenario represents low, moderate, or high an-
nual realizations over twenty simulated years for three environmental factors:
namely, input cost, precipitation, and corn price. As explained in Section 6.2,
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the thirty-one scenarios (identified by scenario number) are dispersed around
the normal scenario 0 for which all environmental factors take on moderate
values.
In interpreting the welfare outcomes reported below, it is helpful to keep
three points in mind. First, these outcomes are conditioned on a fixed value of
125 bushels for the Farmer’s subsistence consumption level C¯F . If the Farmer
is at a subsistence consumption level C¯F in each of the twenty simulated
years, then the total UOC she attains is 96.7. Second, if the Farmer goes
bankrupt and is forced to leave farming, her annual UOC thereafter drops to
0. Third, welfare outcomes do not necessarily peak at the normal scenario 0.
For example, all else equal, city social welfare is highest when precipitation
is low, since this minimizes the risk of city flood damage.
8.3. Welfare Outcomes
Figures 6 and 7 report Farmer and city social welfare outcomes as mea-
sured by expected total UOC and expected total CSW, respectively, for six
tested treatments with low (`), moderate (m), and high (h) treatment values.
These figures also report dispersion ranges around expected outcomes.
Figure 6: Expected total UOC outcomes (with dispersion ranges) for Farmer decision
methods F-OFF and F-ON under six tested (θo, LQE) settings.
Four interesting regularities are apparent in Figs. 6 and 7. First, all else
equal, expected total CSW increases and expected total UOC stays the same
or decreases as LQE is increased from low to high. This occurs because the
increase in LQE implies that a higher CSW outcome can be obtained for the
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Figure 7: Expected total CSW outcomes (with dispersion ranges) for Farmer decision
methods F-OFF and F-ON under six tested (θo, LQE) settings.
same overall budget spending level, either by maintaining current spending
portions, or by shifting monies away from levee investment and towards city
social services and/or subsidy payments.
Second, Farmer and city social welfare are well-aligned with regard to the
Farmer’s decision method. All else equal, expected total UOC and expected
total CSW both tend to be higher for F-ON than for F-OFF. The F-OFF
Farmer tends to select riskier land allocations with higher percentages of
cropland, which in turn tends to increase runoff (hence city flood damage)
as well as the chance of Farmer bankruptcy.
Third, Farmer and city social welfare outcomes are not well-aligned with
regard to Farmer savings behavior. All else equal, expected total UOC is
at or very near its highest level when the Farmer saves a reasonably high
amount (θo = moderate). On the other hand, expected total CSW tends to
be highest when the Farmer saves too little (θo = low), because this forces
the Farmer to allocate at least some of her land to retention land in order to
secure income for the purchase of inputs for crop production.
Fourth, the dispersion ranges around expected welfare outcomes tend to
be larger (and in some cases substantially larger) for the F-OFF treatments
relative to the F-ON treatments. These dispersion ranges reflect, in aggregate
form, how welfare outcomes vary across environmental scenarios.
To provide a better understanding of the dispersion ranges depicted in
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Figure 8: Total UOC outcomes for Farmer decision methods F-OFF and F-ON under six
tested (θo, LQE) settings, differentiated by environmental scenario. Scenario data points
corresponding to the same treatment are connected by lines for visual clarity.
Figs. 6 and 7, Farmer and city social welfare outcomes are reported in Figs. 8
and 9 for the same set of treatments depicted in Figs. 6 and 7, only now
differentiated by environmental scenario.6 Specifically, these figures report
total UOC and total CSW for each of the thirty-one environmental scenarios
constructed in Section 6.2, where the identification numbers for these thirty-
one scenarios range from -15 to +15.
Figures 8 and 9 reveal, in stark terms, that total UOC and total CSW
both exhibit much greater dispersion across scenarios in the F-OFF treat-
6Some types of symbols in Figs. 8 and 9 are obscured beneath other types of symbols
for cases in which outcomes are not sensitive to changes in a treatment factor setting.
For example, for the F-ON case depicted in Fig. 8 the black-bordered open circles lie
completely beneath the black-filled circles because total UOC is not affected by a change
from LQE=high to LQE=low, given θo=mod.
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Figure 9: Total CSW outcomes for Farmer decision methods F-OFF and F-ON under six
tested (θo, LQE) settings, differentiated by environmental scenario. Scenario data points
corresponding to the same treatment are connected by lines for visual clarity.
ments than in the corresponding F-ON treatments. This greater dispersion
reflects the F-OFF Farmer’s singular focus on the expected net earnings as-
sociated with different land uses, ignoring production risks arising from un-
certain precipitation and corn prices.
Consider, for example, the welfare outcomes in Figs. 8 and 9 correspond-
ing to the treatment with θo=moderate and LQE=low, depicted by black-
bordered open circles.7 Given θo=moderate, the Farmer annually plans to
put aside a moderately large amount of money for future contingencies.
Given LQE=low, levee investment is not a very effective use of city bud-
get monies for city flood-damage mitigation; hence, if additional mitigation
is desired, the City Manager has to offer the Farmer a sufficiently high sub-
7A detailed discussion of this treatment is provided in Tesfatsion et al. (2016, Section
6) for the normal scenario 0.
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sidy rate to induce her to allocate part of her farmland to retention land
rather than to cropland.
Thus, at least during the first few years (bolstered by her initial money
holdings), the F-OFF Farmer has sufficient funds to purchase inputs for crop
production through her own savings and/or through subsidy payments for
retention land. The primary determinant of her annual cropland allocation
at time t:3 during each year t is the input cost realized at time t:1; a low
input cost induces a high cropland allocation, and vice versa. The F-OFF
Farmer pays no attention to the risk of a bad crop yield arising from adverse
weather (too much or too little precipitation) or to the risk of low net earnings
arising from a low corn price. Rather, she essentially assumes that moderate
precipitation and a moderate corn price will prevail.
In contrast, the F-ON Farmer selects a land allocation at each time t:3
in each year t that is conditional on the input cost realized at time t:1 but
that also takes into account the full range of possible precipitation and corn
price outcomes. The result is that the F-ON Farmer tends each year to
allocate less of her land to cropland (and more of her land to retention-land)
than the F-OFF Farmer, all else equal. Consequently, although the F-OFF
Farmer does better than the F-ON Farmer in good farming years, the F-OFF
Farmer does worse than the F-ON Farmer in bad farming years and is more
likely to go bankrupt before the end of the twenty years. If the Farmer goes
bankrupt, all of her land reverts to fallow land with a relatively high curve
number (runoff potential) and her utility-of-consumption (UOC) drops to 0.
The land allocation decisions and welfare outcomes for the F-OFF Farmer
are thus more volatile over time than those for the F-ON Farmer. This, in
turn, induces more volatility in city social welfare outcomes.
9. Discussion
This study reports on the development of the WACCShed platform, an
open source agent-based Java framework that permits watersheds to be stud-
ied as coupled natural and human systems. A key feature of this platform
is its ability to model strategic decision-making among multiple types of hu-
man participants seeking to survive and prosper over time within watershed
environments affected by climate and market events and constrained by in-
stitutional arrangements.
A watershed application is presented in accordance with the ODD pro-
tocol template (Grimm et al., 2010b) in order to provide a concrete demon-
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stration of the capabilities and use of the WACCShed platform. Given its
purpose, the application is deliberately kept simple. The application reflects,
in highly stylized form, the basic structural aspects of the Squaw Creek wa-
tershed in central Iowa: namely, an agricultural watershed with upstream
farmland and a downstream city overseen by a city manager.
The watershed application demonstrates the platform’s ability to model
policy interventions; the city manager sets an annual subsidy rate ($/acre)
for water-retention land as a mitigation device for city flood damage. The
application also illustrates the platform’s ability to model strategic human
decision-making by focusing on strategic interactions between the city man-
ager, concerned solely with city social welfare, and an upstream farmer whose
objective is to ensure the prosperity of her farming business over time. The
city manager chooses his annual budget allocation taking into account how
the resulting retention-land subsidy rate will affect the farmer’s land allo-
cation, with subsequent implications for city flood damage. The findings
reported in Section 8 confirm that this strategic interaction substantially
affects farmer and city social welfare outcomes over time.
Moreover, although the application is primarily a qualitative render-
ing of a watershed, it indicates the platform’s ability to implement more
empirically-based watershed models. Empirical data from Iowa are used to
construct climate and market scenarios for the application, and the harvest
yield function and city flood damage function used in the application are
informed by actual harvest yield and curve number data from Iowa.
An important capability of the WACCShed platform that is not explored
in the current study is its suitability for use in Iterative Participatory Mod-
eling (IPM) studies. As detailed in Barreteau et al. (2012) and Giuliani and
Castelletti (2013), IPM envisions multidisciplinary researchers and stake-
holders engaging together over time in the modeling and study of real-world
systems of common interest. The intent is to help researchers and stake-
holders manage complex systems through an ongoing collaborative learning
process rather than through the attempted discovery of definitive problem
solutions.
During 2016 the watershed application was used as the initial model for
an IPM process whose purpose was improved local governance for the Squaw
Creek watershed in central Iowa. Interactions with stakeholders led the mod-
eling team to consider how the WACCShed platform could be used to develop
extended versions of this application to address issues of particular concern
to these stakeholders. For example, how would the introduction of different
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types of crop insurance programs affect farmer and city social welfare out-
comes over time relative to the no-insurance base-case application reported
in the current study? Future studies will report on this IPM-inspired work.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Nomenclature Tables for the Watershed Application
A variable appearing within a model is classified as endogenous if its value
is determined within the model. A variable appearing within a model is
classified as exogenous if its value is set as an external input to the model.
Table A.4 provides a list of symbols, units of measurement, and abbre-
viated definitions for the endogenous variables appearing in the watershed
application. Table A.5 provides a list of symbols, values, and abbreviated
definitions for the exogenous variables appearing in the watershed applica-
tion. In both tables, “F” designates the Farmer and “CM” designates the
City Manager.
An exogenous variable in Table A.5 is labeled “Random” if it is randomly
determined and “TF” if it is a treatment factor whose value is systematically
varied across sensitivity study treatments. The possible realizations for the
random variables are given in Section 6.2, and the ranges of tested values for
the treatment factors are given in Section 7.
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Table A.4: Endogenous variables for the watershed application
Symbol Unit Description
Acropt:3 acres Cropland selected by F at t:3
Arett:3 acres Retention land selected by F at t:3
Afalt:3 acres Fallow land selected by F at t:3
ct:3 decimal % F’s cropland allocation percentage at t:3
CCropt:5 bushels F’s corn crop realized at t:5
ConsFt:7 bushels F’s actual corn consumption at t:7
CSWt:5 $ City social welfare for year t, determined at t:5
FDt:5 $ City flood damage realized during subperiod t5
Ht:5 bushels/acre Harvest yield realized during subperiod t5
`t:2 decimal % CM’s budget allocation percentage for levee investment at t:2
LevInvt:2 $ CM’s levee investment at t:2
LQt:2 height in feet Levee quality for year t determined at t:2
Mt:k $ F’s money holdings at time t:k 6= 1:1
Mposst:7 $ F’s money holdings at t:7 if she sells her total crop
Qp,t:5 ft3/s ≡ cfs Peak water discharge rate into city during subperiods t1-t5
rt:3 decimal % F’s retention-land allocation percentage at t:3
RetSubposst:2 $ CM’s planned subsidy payment expenditures at t:2
RetSubactt:3 $ CM’s actual subsidy payment expenditures at t:3
st:2 decimal % CM’s budget allocation percentage for subsidy payments at t:2
SFt:7 $ F’s actual savings level determined at t:7
SocServposst:2 $ CM’s planned social service expenditures at t:2
SocServactt:3 $ CM’s actual social service expenditures at t:3
τt:2 $/acre Retention-land subsidy rate set by CM at t:2
UOCt:7 utils F’s utility-of-consumption for year t, determined at t:7
Valuecropt:6 $ Market value of F’s corn crop at t:6
XCMt:k state CM’s state at time t:k 6= 1:1
XFt:k state F’s state at time t:k 6= 1:1
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Table A.5: Exogenous variables for the watershed application
Symbol Value Description
αH 0.8 scalar Scale parameter (harvest yield function)
AF 4,000 acres Farmland owned and managed by F
AW 444 acres City land area managed by CM
Bt:1 1M $ City budget at time t:1 for each year t
C¯F 125 bushels F’s subsistence corn-consumption for each year t
CM agent City Manager residing in urban watershed area
CNbare 86 scalar Curve number for bare soil
CNmcrop 78 scalar Curve number for cropland with mature crop
CNfal 70 scalar Curve number for fallow land
CNret 10 scalar Curve number for water-retention land
CPricet:6 Random, $/bushel Corn price realized at t:6
CPricelow 3.66 $/bushel Low corn price realization (25% probability)
CPricemod 4.40 $/bushel Moderate corn price realization (50% probability)
CPricehigh 5.68 $/bushel High corn price realization (25% probability)
D 126 bushels Farmer risk-tolerance parameter (utility-of-consumption function)
DCM set CM’s decision domain for budget allocation percentages
DF (rmax) set F’s decision domain for land allocation percentages
Dopt 26.72 in Optimal rainfall parameter (harvest yield function)
δ 0.02 (2%) Levee quality depreciation rate for each year t
F agent Farmer who owns the farmland
FDmax 100Bt:1 $ Max possible flood damage parameter (flood damage function)
g 10−5 ft/$ Parameter (levee quality update function)
Hmax 168 bushels/acre Maximum yield parameter (harvest yield function)
InputCostt:1 Random, $/acre Per-acre corn planting input cost realized at t:1
InputCostlow 604.20 $/acre Low input cost realization (25% prob)
InputCostmod 698.00 $/acre Moderate input cost realization (50% prob)
InputCosthigh 815.50 $/acre High input cost realization (25% prob)
LQ0:2 3 ft Levee quality for year 0 determined at time 0:2
LQE TF, scalar Levee quality effectiveness
LScenario 20 yrs Length of each environmental scenario in simulated years
M1:1 4M $ F’s initial money holdings at time 1:1
NScenarios 31 Number of scenarios tested for each treatment
Precipt:5 Random, inches Precipitation pattern (hourly rainfall depth) from
January 1 through October 15 of year t
ψ 1.0 scalar Trade-off parameter (city social welfare function)
Q1n 369.8 cfs Ordinate parameter for 1% flood damage (flood damage function)
Q99n 756.7 cfs Ordinate parameter for 99% flood damage (flood damage function)
rmax 0.25 (25%) F’s maximum permitted retention land percentage
s Random, array Environmental scenario (input cost, precipitation pattern,
and corn price for twenty successive simulated years)
SFo=SF (θo) TF, $ F’s initial savings target (desired end-of-year money holdings)
σD 5 in Width parameter (harvest yield function)
t year index t = 1, 2, . . ., with year t ≡ time interval [t, t+ 1)
t:k time point k = 1, . . . 8, with t:1 ≡ t and t:8 ≡ t+ 1
tk time subperiod tk = [t:k, t:k + 1), k = 1, . . . , 7
θo TF, scalar Parameter determining the scale of SFo
XCM1:1 state CM’s state at the initial time 1:1
XF1:1 state F’s state at the initial time 1:1
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Appendix B. Watershed Application Scenario Construction
As explained in Section 6.2, realizations for annual input costs, precip-
itation patterns, and corn prices in the watershed application are governed
by independent stationary probability distributions. Based on these dis-
tributions, we constructed an ensemble S consisting of thirty-one possible
environmental scenarios s using the following nine steps.
1. Three Java pseudo-random number generators initialized with 5000
distinct seeds were used to generate three groups of 5000 sequences
of length twenty for input costs x, precipitation y, and corn price z,
respectively, in accordance with the independent stationary probability
distributions specified in Section 6.2.
2. The sequences from these three groups were then matched (in their
order of generation) to form 5000 scenarios sˆ, each twenty simulated
years in length, as illustrated below:
sˆ =
(
(xsˆ1, y
sˆ
1, z
sˆ
1), (x
sˆ
2, y
sˆ
2, z
sˆ
2), . . . , (x
sˆ
20, y
sˆ
20, z
sˆ
20)
)
(B.1)
3. Without loss of generality, the numerical x, y, and z values in each
scenario sˆ were then replaced by indicator values equal to 0 for a low
value, 1 for a moderate value, and 2 for a high value.
4. The resulting collection Sˆ of 5000 scenarios sˆ was then enlarged to 5003
scenarios by the addition of (i) the extreme-low scenario slow consisting
of all 0 values; (ii) the normal scenario snorm consisting of all 1 values;
and (iii) the extreme-high scenario shigh consisting of all 2 values. Let
this augmented scenario set be denoted by SˆA.
5. The distance d(sˆ, snorm) of each scenario sˆ in SˆA from the normal sce-
nario snorm was then calculated using a Hamming signed-distance mea-
sure that calculates the accumulated differences in successive scenario
values. For example, given two-year scenarios
sˆ = ((0, 1, 1), (2, 1, 0)) and snorm = ((1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)) (B.2)
one has
d(sˆ, snorm) = (0− 1) + (1− 1) + (1− 1) + (2− 1) + (1− 1) + (0− 1)
= −1. (B.3)
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6. Each scenario sˆ in SˆA was then assigned to one and only one of the
following thirty-one scenario clusters Sd in accordance with its signed
distance d = d(sˆ, snorm):
−60, [−59,−15], [−14,−13], − 12, − 11, − 10, .....,−1
0, 1, ....., 10, 11, 12, [13, 14], [15, 59], 60 (B.4)
7. For each scenario cluster Sd, a single representative scenario sd was then
selected from among those scenarios in Sd having the highest assigned
probability. The resulting set S of thirty-one selected scenarios sd was
then taken to be the scenario ensemble for the watershed application.
8. The original probability assigned to each sd in S was then re-normalized
by setting this probability equal to the number of scenarios in cluster
Sd, divided by 5003, so that the summation of the re-normalized prob-
abilities attached to the thirty-one scenarios in S exactly equaled 1.0.
9. Each of the thirty-one scenarios sd in S was then assigned a scenario
number equal to its signed distance from the normal scenario snorm.
Note that the scenario number for snorm is 0.
The resulting probability distribution for the thirty-one environmental
scenarios in S is depicted in Fig. 5.
Appendix C. Harvest Yield in the Watershed Application
In the watershed application, the planting density (seeds/acre) is assumed
to be constant over time. The harvest yield Ht:5 (bushels/acre) realized
at time t:5 during each year t is therefore assumed to depend only on the
precipitation pattern Precipt:5:
Ht:5 = H(Precipt:5) (C.1)
The specification of the harvest yield function (C.1) will now be explained
in greater detail. This specification is not an empirically-derived expression.
Rather, it is a general qualitative depiction of key relationships.
As depicted in Fig. C.10, the harvest yield Ht:5 depends on the rainfall
depth Dt during the growing season (May 1 through October 15), where
Dt in turn is a function of the precipitation pattern Precipt:5. The rainfall
depth Dt is measured as the total accumulated rainfall during the growing
season, measured in inches. The harvest yield attains its maximum value
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Figure C.10: Harvest yield H(D) as a function of rainfall depth D, conditional on a
constant planting density (seeds/acre)
Hmax for a certain optimal amount of rainfall, Dopt. Below this optimal
amount, harvest yield is reduced because the crops need more water. Above
this optimal amount, harvest yield is reduced because the soil is too wet. For
either low rainfall or high rainfall, harvest yield is a fraction αH of H
max.
More precisely, the harvest yield (C.1) is calculated using the following
Gaussian functional form:
Ht:5 = H
max ·
[
αH + (1− αH) exp
(
− (Dt −D
opt)2
σ2D
)]
(C.2)
The parameter σD in (C.2) controls the width of the bell curve.
The values for all of the parameters appearing in (C.2) are given in Ta-
ble A.5. The value for Hmax, 168 bushels/acre, is the Northwest Iowa district
average corn yield from 2005-2014, as reported in AGDM (2015, Table 1).
Appendix D. City Flood Damage in the Watershed Application
In the watershed application, city flood damage FDt:5 at time t:5 during
each year t is determined as a function of the city’s levee quality LQt:2 and
the peak water discharge rate Qp,t:5 into the city:
FDt:5 = FD(LQt:2, Qp,t:5) (D.1)
The precise manner in which the flood damage (D.1) is calculated will now
be explained. This specification is not an empirically-derived expression.
Rather, it is a general qualitative depiction of key relationships.
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Figure D.11: City flood damage function FD as a function of the water discharge rate Q,
conditional on a given levee quality LQ.
As illustrated in Fig. D.11, for any given levee quality, flood damage FD is
assumed to be small until the water discharge rate Q reaches a point where
the water flow begins to overtop the levee. As Q increases further, flood
damage increases sharply. However, for large Q, the entire city is flooded
and flood damage approaches the maximum avoidable flood damage, FDmax.
More precisely, the city flood damage function is specified as a logistic
function:
FD(LQ,Q) =
FDmax
1 + exp
(− Q−Qh(LQ)
∆Q(LQ)
) (D.2)
where
Qh(LQ) =
Q1(LQ) +Q99(LQ)
2
(D.3)
and
∆Q(LQ) =
Q99(LQ)−Q1(LQ)
9.2
(D.4)
and Q1 and Q99 are the discharges at which the flood damage is 1% and
99%, respectively, of the maximum value. The discharge rates Q1(LQ) and
Q99(LQ) are assumed to increase linearly with levee quality:
Q1(LQ) = Q1n + a1LQ (D.5)
Q99(LQ) = Q99n + a99LQ (D.6)
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where Q1n and Q99n are the values of Q1 and Q99 with no levee, and a1 and
a99 are coefficients.
As detailed in Section 7.4, a common “levee quality effectiveness” value,
LQE = a1 = a99, is set for the parameters a1 and a99 in (D.5) and (D.6). This
LQE value is systematically varied as a treatment factor across sensitivity
experiments. The initializations maintained for all other parameters in the
flood damage function (D.2) are provided in Table A.5.
Finally, the peak water discharge rate Qp,t:5 in (D.1) for subperiod t5 (Oc-
tober) is calculated as follows. Recall that the growing season for each year t
is May 1 through October 15. The Hydrology application component for the
watershed application is based on the HEC-HMS Hydrologic Modeling Sys-
tem (Feldman, 2000; Scharffenberg, 2013). Since the Hydrology application
component runs on hourly time-steps, it calculates a water discharge rate for
each simulated hour from January 1 through October 15. This hourly water
discharge rate depends on the following factors: the hourly realized rainfall
depth as determined by the realized precipitation pattern Precipt:5 (low, mod,
or high); the Farmer’s land allocation at time t:3; the curve numbers (CNs)
for bare soil and fallow land; and the time-varying CN for cropland.8 The
peak water discharge rate Qp,t:5 is then calculated as the maximum hourly
water discharge recorded from January 1 through October 15.
Appendix E. Farmer’s F-OFF and F-ON Decision Methods
Appendix E.1. F-OFF: Expected Consumption Maximization
The F-OFF Farmer solves two successive optimization problems in each
year t, as follows:
 First-Stage Optimization Problem: At time t:3, conditional on state
XFt:3, choose a land allocation (ct:3, rt:3) ∈ DF to maximize expected
possible money holdings E[Mposst:7 (c, τt:2r) |XFt:3] for time t:7.
 Second-Stage Optimization Problem: At time t:7, conditional on state
XFt:7, choose the maximum possible consumption level Cons
F
t:7 subject
to the budget, subsistence, and savings-target constraints (31)–(33).
8The CN for cropland is set equal to the bare soil CN (86) on May 1 and is then
decreased by 1 every ten simulated days until it reaches the mature crop CN (78) on July
20th. This mature crop CN is maintained for the cropland until harvest day, October 15,
after which the CN for cropland reverts back to the bare soil CN (86).
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An if-then decision rule will next be given that constructively solves the
Farmer’s first-stage optimization problem at time t:3.9 The statement of
this if-then decision rule makes use of the following three calculations for net
earnings, defined to be revenues minus costs.
The net earnings obtained by the Farmer from the sale of her corn crop
at time t:7, per acre of her planted cropland, is given by
NetEarnt:7 = CPricet:6 ·H(Precipt:5)− InputCostt:1 ($/acre) (E.1)
Given the ensemble of possible environmental scenarios specified in Appendix
B, the net earnings (E.1) can be either positive or negative. At time t:3 the
Farmer calculates her expected net earnings per acre of planted cropland,
conditional on her time t:3 state, as
Et:3pi
crop = E
[
NetEarnt:7 |XFt:3
]
= ECPrice · EH(Precip)− InputCostt:1 (E.2)
In addition, the Farmer knows that her expected net earnings per acre of
retention land is given by the subsidy rate τt:2 announced by the City Manager
at time t:2, as determined in (7); i.e.,
Et:3pi
ret = τt:2 (E.3)
Finally, the Farmer knows that her expected net earnings per acre of fallow
land is zero; i.e.,
Et:3pi
fal = 0 (E.4)
In addition, the statement of this if-then decision rule makes use of rL,
defined to be the largest value of r in [0, rmax] that maximizes cmax(τt:2r)
subject to cmax(τt:2r) + r ≤ 1, where cmax(τt:2r) is given in (19).10
Solution to Farmer’s First-Stage Optimization Problem at Time t:3
Case 1: If Et:3pi
crop > Et:3pi
ret > Et:3pi
fal, plant the largest feasible portion
of farmland as cropland, allocate the portion rL to retention, and leave the
remaining portion fallow; i.e., set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (c
max(τt:2r
L), rL) (E.5)
9A proof of this claim is provided in Tesfatsion et al. (2016, Appendix E.2).
10A constructive proof for determining the value of rL is provided in Tesfatsion et al.
(2016, Appendix E.2).
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Case 2: If Et:3pi
crop > Et:3pi
ret = Et:3pi
fal, implying τt:2 = 0, plant the
largest feasible portion of farmland as cropland and, with prob 1/2-1/2,
allocate the rest to retention or fallow land; i.e., with prob 1/2-1/2 set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (c
max(0),min{1− cmax(0), rmax})
or (ct:3, rt:3) = (c
max(0), 0) (E.6)
Case 3: If Et:3pi
ret > Et:3pi
fal ≥ Et:3picrop, allocate the largest feasible
portion of farmland to retention and leave the remainder fallow; i.e., set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (0, r
max) (E.7)
Case 4: If Et:3pi
ret = Et:3pi
fal ≥ Et:3picrop, then with prob 1/2-1/2 allocate
the largest feasible portion of farmland to retention and the remainder to
fallow, or allocate all farmland to fallow; i.e., with prob 1/2-1/2 set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (0, r
max) or (ct:3, rt:3) = (0, 0) (E.8)
Case 5: If Et:3pi
ret ≥ Et:3picrop > Et:3pifal, allocate the largest feasible
portion of farmland to retention, allocate the largest feasible portion of the
remainder to cropland, and leave the rest fallow; i.e., set
(ct:3, rt:3) = (min{cmax(τt:2rmax), 1− rmax}, rmax) (E.9)
Consider, now, the Farmer’s second-stage optimization problem at time
t:7. The Farmer’s initial savings target for her money holdings at the end of
year t takes form (35), where θo determines the scale of this target, E[CPrice]
is the stationary expectation for the annual corn price, and C¯F is the Farmer’s
annual subsistence need for corn.
Solution to Farmer’s Second-Stage Optimization Problem at Time t:7
 If the Farmer’s money holdings are insufficient to attain her subsistence
consumption C¯F , i.e., if Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) < CPricet:6 · C¯F , then
ConsFt:7 =
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3)
CPricet:6
< C¯F (E.10)
and the Farmer exits the watershed at the end of subperiod t7.
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 If the Farmer’s money holdings are sufficient to attain C¯F but not to
attain SF (θo), i.e., if CPricet:6 · C¯F ≤ Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) < SF (θo) +
CPricet:6 · C¯F , then
ConsFt:7 = C¯
F and SFt:7 = M
poss
t:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3)− CPricet:6 · C¯F (E.11)
 If the Farmer’s money holdings are sufficient to attain C¯F and SF (θo),
i.e., if Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3) ≥ SF (θo) + CPricet:6 · C¯F , then
ConsFt:7 =
[
Mposst:7 (ct:3, τt:2rt:3)− SF (θo)
]
CPricet:6
and SFt:7 = S
F (θo) (E.12)
Appendix E.2. F-ON: Expected Utility-of-Consumption Maximization
Without loss of generality, the Farmer’s implementation of the F-ON
decision method will be carefully explained for time 1:3 during the initial
year 1. This problem formulation can easily be generalized to apply to time
t:3 for an arbitrary year t ≥ 1.
Suppose the Farmer at time 1:3 in year 1 is considering the selection of
her land allocation, consumption, and savings decisions for year 1, denoted
as follows:
dF =
(
c1:3, r1:3,Cons
F
1:7, S
F
1:7
)
(E.13)
However, the Farmer realizes that, between her choice of land allocation
percentages at time 1:3 and her choice of consumption and savings decisions
at time 1:7, she will acquire additional information: namely, she will observe
the realization of a precipitation pattern Precip1:5 and a corn price CPrice1:6.
Consequently, in order to make efficient use of her information, she should
choose the decisions in (E.13) as functions of her available information.
The Farmer’s state XF1:3 at time 1:3 includes her state X
F
1:1 at time 1:1,
her input-cost observation InputCost1:1 at time 1:1, and the City Manager’s
subsidy-rate τ1:2 for year 1 as announced at time 1:2. That is,
XF1:3 =
{
XF1:1, InputCost1:1, τ1:2
}
(E.14)
The Farmer’s state XF1:1 at time 1:1 includes all structural aspects of her
decision environment, including the value of θo that affects the scale of her
initial savings target (35) for the end of year 1.
At time 1:3 the Farmer selects (c1:3, r1:3) from her decision domainD
F (rmax)
in (11) as functions (c(XF1:3),r(X
F
1:3)) of her time-1:3 state X
F
1:3. However, the
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Farmer also understands that her state XF1:7 at time 1:7 will be larger than
her state XF1:3 at time 1:3, as follows:
XF1:7 =
{
XF1:3,Precip1:5,CPrice1:6
}
(E.15)
Consequently, to determine an optimal solution for her expected utility-of-
consumption (UOC) maximization problem at time 1:3, the Farmer must
consider state-contingent decision functions of the following form:
dF (X1) =
(
c(XF1:3), r(X
F
1:3),Cons
F (XF1:7), S
F (XF1:7)
)
(E.16)
The F-ON Farmer’s expected UOC maximization problem at time 1:3
thus takes the following form:
max E [u(ConsF1:7) |XF1:3] (E.17)
with respect to choice of dF subject to the constraints
dF = dF (X1) (E.18)
0 ≤ c1:3 (E.19)
0 ≤ r1:3 ≤ rmax (E.20)
c1:3 + r1:3 ≤ 1 (E.21)
M1:3 = M1:1 + τ1:2 · r1:3 · AF (E.22)
M1:4 = M1:3 − InputCost1:1 · c1:3 · AF (E.23)
M1:4 ≥ 0 (E.24)
Mposs1:7 = M1:4 + CPrice1:6 ·H1:5 · c1:3 · AF (E.25)
ConsF1:7 ≥ C¯F (E.26)
CPrice1:6 · ConsF1:7 = Mposs1:7 − SF1:7 (E.27)
SF1:7 = θ1:7 · E
[
CPrice
] · C¯F (E.28)
θ1:7 = max
0≤ρ≤1
{ ρ · θo | F’s problem has a solution} (E.29)
Detailed explanations for constraints (E.19) through (E.28) are provided
in Section 6.3. However, constraint (E.29) needs further explanation. Sup-
pose the Farmer’s savings target is fixed at the initial savings target level
SF (θo) by setting θ1:7 = θ
o in (E.28) and by omitting the ratcheting con-
straint (E.29). Then the above expected UOC maximization problem will
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fail to have a solution if there exists a feasible state X1:7 in which the Farmer
is unable to attain both her initial savings target and her subsistence con-
sumption level. Consequently, it is instead assumed that the F-ON Farmer
is able to ratchet down her savings target towards zero in any state X1:7 in
which she is unable to attain both her initial savings target and her sub-
sistence consumption level. This state-contingent downward ratcheting is
captured in constraint (E.29).
It could happen for some feasible time-1:7 state X1:7 that the F-ON
Farmer is unable to attain her subsistence consumption level even if she
ratchets her savings target all the way down to zero. For any such state, the
Farmer at time 1:3 plans to consume as much as she can at time 1:7 followed
immediately by a permanent departure from the watershed.
For analytical tractability, the F-ON Farmer’s decision domain DF (rmax)
in (11) – represented by constraints (E.19) through (E.21) in the above ex-
pected UOC maximization problem – is approximated by a finite subset
ADF (rmax), constructed as follows. First, the range of possible values for
the F-ON Farmer’s cropland portion c and retention land portion r are re-
stricted to the following subsets:
c ∈ C = {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0} (E.30)
r ∈ R(rmax) = {0.0, 0.2, . . . , 0.8, 1.0} · rmax (E.31)
Second, ADF (rmax) is constructed as
ADF (rmax) = {(c, r) | c ∈ C, r ∈ R(rmax), c+ r ≤ 1} (E.32)
Finally, if the expected UOC maximization problem (E.17) for any year
t has multiple possible solutions, the Farmer uses a pseudo-random number
generator to select one of the solutions at random.
Appendix F. City Manager’s CM-ON Decision Method
At time t:2 in each year t, conditional on state XCMt:2 , the City Manager
selects a budget allocation (st:2, `t:2) ∈ DCM to maximize expected city social
welfare E[CSWt:5 |XCMt:2 ] subject to system constraints,11 where DCM is given
by (5) and CSWt:5 is given by (26).
11Levee investment at time t:2 is a physical capital investment that could yield a stream
of returns over both current and future years in the form of increased flood-damage miti-
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The CM-ON City Manager knows that city flood damage FDt:5 at time
t:5 depends in part on his budget allocation decision (st:2,lt:2) at time t:2.
Specifically, he knows that flood damage is determined by the functional
relationship (24), reproduced here for ease of reference:
FDt:5(`t:2, ct:3, rt:3) = FD
(
LQ(`t:2), Qp,t:5(ct:3, rt:3)
)
(F.1)
where the peak water discharge rate Qp is given by
Qp,t:5(ct:3, rt:3) = Qp
(
Precipt:5, A
crop(ct:3), A
ret(rt:3), A
fal(ct:3, rt:3)
)
(F.2)
Thus, FDt:5 depends through Qp,t:5 on the Farmer’s land allocation decision
at t:3, which in turn depends on the City Manager’s retention subsidy de-
cision st:2; and FDt:5 depends on the levee quality LQ(`t:2), which in turn
depends on the City Manager’s levee investment decision `t:2.
The CM-ON City Manager’s state XCMt:2 at time t:2 includes the Farmer’s
initial state, XFt:1, and the input cost realization InputCostt:1. In addition,
however, it also includes all structural aspects of the CM’s decision environ-
ment, including in particular the independent stationary probability distri-
butions governing the realizations of the precipitation pattern Precipt:5 and
the corn price CPricet:6. Thus, the CM-ON City Manager at time t:2 is able
to calculate the Farmer’s response functions c(XFt:3) and r(X
F
t:3) for ct:3 and
rt:3 at time t:3 as functions of the Farmer’s time-t:3 state, given by
12
XFt:3 = {XFt:1, InputCostt:1, st:2} (F.3)
However, the CM-ON City Manager at time t:2 still does not know for
sure the future flood damage level FDt:5 as a function of his decisions st:2
and `t:2 at time t:2 because FDt:5 in (F.1) also depends (through Qp,t:5) on
the random event Precipt:5. Thus, from the vantage point of t:2, year-t CSW
is an (st:2, `t:2)-conditioned random variable of the form
CSW(st:2, `t:2, c(X
F
t:3), r(X
F
t:3), Precipt:5) (F.4)
gation. Ideally, this full stream of returns should be taken into account in the specification
of CSW. However, for the watershed application, it is assumed for simplicity that the
CM-ON City Manager at each time t:2 only considers year-t returns to levee investment.
12In game theory terms, this makes the CM-ON City Manager a Stackelberg leader,
able to determine the response of the Farmer-follower at time t:3 to each of his possible
decisions st:2 at time t:2.
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where the only aspect that is random as of time t:2 is the precise realization
for Precipt:5. Consequently, at time t:2 the CM-ON City Manager forms an
expectation for year-t CSW, conditional on each of his possible choices for
(st:2, `t:2), where the expectation is taken with respect to the known proba-
bility distribution for Precipt:5.
The CM-ON City Manager’s expected CSW maximization problem at
time t:2 thus takes the following form:
max
st:2,`t:2
E[CSW(st:2, `t:2, c(XFt:3), r(XFt:3),Precipt:5) |XCMt:2 ] (F.5)
subject to (F.3), the calculated forms of the response functions c(XFt:3) and
r(XFt:3), and the constraints
0 ≤ st:2 (F.6)
0 ≤ `t:2 (F.7)
st:2 + `t:2 ≤ 1 (F.8)
For analytical tractability, the City Manager’s decision domain DCM in
(5) – represented by constraints (F.6) through (F.8) above – is approximated
by a finite subset ADCM , constructed as follows. The range of possible values
for the City Manager’s subsidy portion s and levee investment portion ` are
restricted to the following subsets:
s ∈ S = {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0} (F.9)
` ∈ L = {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1.0} (F.10)
Then ADCM is given by
ADCM = {(s, `) | s ∈ S, ` ∈ L, s+ ` ≤ 1} (F.11)
Finally, if the expected CSW maximization problem (F.5) for any year
t has multiple possible solutions, the CM-ON City Manager uses a pseudo-
random number generator to select one of these solutions at random.
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